

Civil-Military Relations in Egypt Since 2013*

2013'ten Sonra Mısır'daki Sivil-Askerî İlişkiler

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Abstract

The military has been a powerful and active actor in Egyptian politics since Naser period. By the collapse of the Mobarak regime as a result of the popular demonstrations in 2011, hopes for democratization increased; however, the military coup against Morsi administration once again changed the balance in civil- military relations in favor of the military and led the military to become dominant actor in both Egyptian politics and economics. This article analyzes civil-military relations in Egypt since July 2013 and attempts to understand to what extent the military was empowered by the privileged rights in both politics and economics. Within that framework, given rights and power by the constitution to the military, gained privileged rights at the executive, legislative and judiciary levels, economic power and activities of the military, and its influence over media and civil society were examined. This article argues that on the one hand military has been certainly consolidating its dominancy in Egyptian politics and economics since 2013, on the other hand the military involvement in politics and economics has been deteriorating institutionalism and efficiency of the Army itself.

Keywords: Egypt, civil-military relations, military coup, El Sisi.

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Öz

Asker, Nasır döneminden beri Mısır siyasetinde güçlü ve etkin bir aktör olmuştur. 2011 yılında halk ayaklanmasıyla sona eren Mübarek rejiminden sonra Mısır'da demokratikleşme ihtimaline dair umutlar yeşerse de Mursi yönetimine karşı yapılan askeri darbeyle asker-sivil ilişkisindeki denge bir kez daha askerler lehine kaymış ve Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin başat aktör olmalarını hızlandıran bir süreç yaşanmıştır. Bu makale Temmuz 2013 yılından sonraki süreçte Mısır siyasetindeki asker-sivil ilişkisini analiz etmekte ve askerlerin hem Mısır siyasetinde hem de ekonomisinde elde ettikleri ayrıcalıklı haklarla ne kadar güçlendiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, anayasanın askerlere tanıdığı haklar, yasama-yürütme-yargı katmanlarında askerlerin edindikleri ayrıcalıklar, askerlerin ekonomik güçleri ve faaliyetleri, ve medya ve sivil toplum üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. Makale, 2013 yılından itibaren Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin ayrıcalıklı konumlarının güçlendiğini savunmakla birlikte, bu sürecin Mısır ordusunun kurumsal ve askeri verimliliğini de azalttığını öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır, asker-sivil ilişkisi, askeri darbe, El Sisi.

Introduction

Egypt, in which military has always had important role in politics, entered a new phase in the aftermath of popular uprisings against Mobarak regime in 2011. When a military coup happened in 2013, the civil-military relations in Egyptian politics once again started to be discussed. Regarding the literature on civil-military relations, the primary concern has always been understanding the roots of domination of military in politics and figuring out the ways to make civilian authorities to dominate. Taking into consideration theoretical studies on civil-military relations, this article attempts to understand military role in Egyptian politics since 2013. It primarily aims to explain to what extent and in what means the military is dominating the politics, while viewing the continuities and changes on the civil-military relations in Egypt. However, it is observed that the impacts of

expanding power and authority of the military regime on the sufficiency of military itself have been mostly ignored in the literature on civil-military relations. Therefore, this article will attempt to fill this gap in the literature explaining the impact of unbalanced civil-military relations on the Army itself. In conclusion, this article argues that the dominancy of authoritarian regime, which aims to consolidate its legitimacy through military, is not only deteriorating democratization process but also diminishing the professional efficiency of military itself. Within that framework, this article will respectively analyze constitutional, executive, legislative, judicial and economic power of military, its influence on media and civil society and its professional efficiency with such a huge political and economic power.

1. Theoretical Framework: Civil-Military Relations

Emergence of the contemporary theories on civil-military relations is originated to the beginning of the Cold War. Samuel Huntington, who introduced the concept of professionalism in analyzing civil-military relations, mentioned the concepts of responsibility, corporateness and expertise. Responsibility is the sentiment of the military considering its responsibility towards the society it guards. Expertise is specialization in managing the violence. Corporateness is the structure and attached values, which holds its uniqueness over other forms of corporations¹. Huntington also examines what he called the ‘military mind’, which is described as conservative realist. Huntington proposes that professionalism and the ethics arising from the ‘conservative realist military mind’ are positive contributors to the military efficiency. He also differentiated two types of civilian controls over the military. The first one is the “subjective control”, which could be done by minimizing the military power and maximizing the civilian power through governmental institutions, constitution or social classes.

¹ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and The State*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, London, 1957, s. 8-10.

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The second type is the “objective control”, which could be achieved by maximizing military professionalism, as Huntington describes it by militarizing the military, rather than civilizing it. He viewed the approach of subjective control as harmful to the military professionalism and efficiency.² Morris Janowitz disagrees with Huntington and assumes that the military should follow values and ethics of the society and not to be differentiated from it.³

One of the major critics that faced the early theorization of Huntington and Janowitz is their concentration on the United States and consideration of the Cold War context. However, in the post-Cold War period, not only the meaning of security has changed, but also its actors and the role of state have altered. Agency Theory and Concordance Theory are some of the recent studies that regard factors emerged in the post-Cold War period.

Within the Agency Theory framework, Feaver viewed the relations between the civilians and the military as the relations between master and servant. Civilians possess supremacy and the military subordinates to the civilians. Moreover, Feaver assumes two modes of the military behavior. When the military is obedient and following the civilians’ policies, this is called ‘working’, but when the military is not in complete obedience to civilian policies, it is considered ‘shirking’. Feaver’s assumption here is that the military will try to affect policies whenever it is contraindicated with its preferences. What is ought to be done in these cases that the civilians monitor the military and determine any ‘shirking’ manner and punish it. This theory focuses on the late periods in the USA, namely the Clinton and Bush periods⁴.

² Huntington, *a.g.e.*, s. 83-85.

³ Noboru Yamaguchi and David A. Welch, “Soldiers, civilians, and scholars: making sense of the relationship between civil-military relations and foreign policy”. *Asian Perspective*, 29(1), 2005, s. 213-232.

⁴ *a.g.e.*

Within the Concordance Theory framework, Schiff concentrated on three main actors in the civil-military relations: the military, the political elites and the citizenry. Schiff underlines that these actors should develop cooperative relations. The importance of Schiff's theory lies in its focus on the prediction of military intervention, taking into consideration social and cultural dynamics.⁵ The Concordance Theory does not take into account the type of the political regime, whether it is democratic or not, as preliminary condition to reach the state of concordance, as long as the dialogue and accommodation attributes are present, and the road is pacified for the concordance. Huntington sees the military mind as conservative realist, and the professionalism ethics as prerequisite for military efficiency. When the society ideology is different from military ideology, i.e. the society adopts one of the anti-military ideologies as Huntington describes it, the solution for protecting the military ethics lies in the separation of the institutions between civilians and the military. On the other hand, Schiff proposes no specific form of the relative relations between the military institution and the civilian ones in a way that guarantees the military more authority over its the military affairs. There can be either separation or elimination of boundaries between the civil and military institutions or even another form that lies in the range between those two ends. The most important question is which form of relation will be more accepted by the active actors in the civil-military relations in the wake of their cultural, social and historical context. So, the unique core assumption of Schiff is the rejection of attributing the civilian control of military or the prevention of military intervention to specific condition or form other than the 'concordance' state as target.

Civil-military relations in the Middle East is mostly considered with the democratization process. Bishara states that the problem of civil-military relations in the Middle East is historically rooted. The problem lies in the need for state- and nation-building role of the Arab

⁵ Leman Basak Ari. "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey". Submitted to the Department of Political Science Texas State University, Texas, 2007, s. 20-24.

armies. As Huntington starts his theorization from examining the emergence of modern armies in the west, Bishara examines the emergence of the Arab armies seeing it as an extension of regional organizations of the Ottoman Army, later these armies developed under the foreign occupation. Moreover, the Arab Armies played crucial role during the independence struggle and the establishment of post-independence states. Besides what have been mentioned before on the historical context constraints on Huntington's theory, Bishara adds an important critique to Huntington core concept of professionalism. Huntington proposed professionalism as positive value, yet Bishara examines the side effects that may arise from the professionalism, for example; obedience even in committing illegal and unethical orders; cover up the committed crimes, driven by the brotherhood linkage and inferior view to the civilian politicians.⁶ Bishara also differentiates two types of coups. The first type of coup, which he calls the radical coup, small group of officers, usually middle rank, perform a movement against the regime and control the state. The other type of coup is that when the military itself perform a coup against the political process, which had launched it. The early coups in Egypt, Syria and Iraq resembles the first type. While the Algerian coup in 1992 and 2013 coup in Egypt resembles the second type. Bishara views the rule in Arab states not as military rule but personalistic rule, where the military is used for consolidation of the regimes and guarantee of its persistence in the face of oppositions and popular uprisings⁷.

2. Understanding Civil-Military Relations in Egypt

The army in Egypt especially at the beginning of the Arab Spring gained respect of the Egyptian people as it was considered aligned with the revolution against Mubarak. During Mubarak period, the military was not under heavy criticism because the National

⁶ Azmy Bishara, "*al-Jaysh wa-al-siyāsah*". Bayrūt. al-Markaz al-‘Arabī lil-Abhāth wa-Dirāsāt al-Siyāsāt, Beirut, 2017, s. 25-26.

⁷ *a.g.e.* , s. 30-36.

Democratic Party and the Ministry of Interior were more dominant politically and military role in politics was limited. Economic activities of the military were also less apparent in 2011, than the corrupt National Democratic Party (NDP), and less brutal than Interior Ministry and police forces. Moreover, Egyptians, who benefited from the agrarian reforms implemented by Nasser and witnessed Sadat's 'victory' in 1973 against Israel, hold positive image of the military that was recalled during 2011 revolution days. Also, at that time, when the political tension aroused between the political parties and economic difficulties increased, some people were favor of the military intervention.

Even though the military has always been an influential actor in Egyptian politics, the constitution issued after the 2013 coup, guarantees several political and economic privileges to the military. Therefore, Concordance Theory is relatively more useful in analyzing the Egyptian case, since it takes into consideration historical, cultural and social variables. In the Egyptian case, keeping privileged constitutional position, protecting its economic empire and maintaining superiority in decision-making process, especially in the military affairs, over the civilian leaders are the primary goals of military. For example, by the post-coup constitution the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) started to be headed by the Minister of Defense, who is military officer not civilian; in contrast to 2012 constitution where president headed the SCAF. Furthermore, post-coup constitution gave clear dominance to the military in the National Defense Council, in contrast to 2012 arrangements.⁸

Moreover, political elites, represented in the presidency and the government, and the political parties failed to reach the formula of resolving disputes and setting the rules of the access to power. The shocking part, as Bishara describes, it is the promotion and justification

⁸ Risa Brooks, "Understanding Shifts in Egyptian Civil-Military Relations Lessons from the Past and Present". (2015), DCAF a centre for security, development and the rule of law, Geneva, s. 25.

of the military intervention in Egypt by the civilian intellectuals, who were supposed to adopt liberal and democratic values⁹. One of them is Mohamed El Baradei, the Nobel prize awarded, who accepted being Vice President, but resigned after Rabia massacre against pro-Morsi supporters. While the protests on 30th of July demanded early presidential elections, the elites cheered the coup declaration. Mona Makram Ebid, at her lecture in Middle East Institute in the US, stated that on the morning of 30th of June 2013, she was invited to a meeting with the former Minister Al Kafrawy with a group of politicians and were told that the army needs them to write a request for intervention, which was signed by about fifty political figures. She stated that they demanded the army to ‘intervene to prevent civil war in Egypt.’¹⁰

Finer proposes that when both the disposition and the opportunity are present for the military, it will intervene in politics, yet the level of intervention will depend on the political culture in that state. In low political culture states, he proposes that:

*intervention by pressure and blackmail often occurs; but, in addition, the military are just as likely to come out into the open, overtly overturning governments and installing others (displacement) or even supplanting the civilian régime for good, installing itself in its place*¹¹.

This is what exactly happened in the recent coup in Egypt, when the military ousted elected President and the military leader came to power as new President. The civil-military relations in Egypt is highly constrained by the unchallenged position of the Army as the founder of the republic, and the economic and political interests of the military represents the core issues that hinders the civilian control. Before 2011, the military was subordinated to the President, who mainly came from

⁹ Azmy Bishara, “*al-Jaysh wa-al-siyāsah*”. Bayrūt. al-Markaz al-‘Arabī lil-Abhāth wa-Dirāsāt al-Siyāsāt, Beirut, 2017, s.101.

¹⁰ Middle East Institute , Mona Makram-Ebeid on Egypt's Political Future. [video], 2013

¹¹ Samuel Finer, “The man on horseback”. (1962). Pall Mall Press Limited Cromwell Place, London, s.110.

military, now the military is represented by El Sisi, who is himself dominant in nearly every fields in Egypt.

3. Power and Authority of Military in Egyptian Politics: Continuities and Changes

Literatures on civil-military relations, which are primarily deal with the problems caused by the dominancy of military in politics, brought the issues of measurement of military influence into the agenda. Huntington, for instance, mentions the affiliation to the army and its leaders, the economic and human resources, and the prestige and popularity of the military as the measurement variables for military influence in politics.¹² Regarding the measurement of military power, Huntington also mentions the correlation between the levels of authority and power.¹³ In addition to Huntington's measurement variables, the power and authority of military in the constitutional, executive and judicial levels, representing three main pillars of balancing authorities in any state, will be examined in order to provide insights about the degree of infiltration of the military to the state apparatus.

As mentioned, the military has always been an influential actor in the Egyptian politics. However, the military coup of 2013 represents new trend in the Egyptian politics. The military was more involved in economics especially during Mubarak period; the politics was dominated with National Democratic Party and by using the Ministry of Interior as repression tool for political opposition. During the years of Arab Spring, the military in Egypt was responsible for the transitional period and was supposed to transit the power to civilians. Therefore, the military coup in 2013 is the first time that the military makes dislocation of the political group from power and replace it by the military leadership in pure coup action since 1952 coup. It also represents the type of military coup, where the military coups against political process was initiated by the military itself. The escalation of

¹² Huntington, *a.g.e.*, s. 88-89.

¹³ *A.g.e.* s. 86.

Muslim Brotherhood to power represented in Morsi presidency constituted threat for the military interests due to the historical and ideological contrasts between the two factions. Therefore, the military decided to control the power and the post-coup period witnessed exaggerated consolidation of military power, not even on the expense of opposition, but also on the expense of allied groups like General Intelligence and the businessmen. The consolidation of the political authorities is explained in the constitutional changes with respect to the previous constitutions. The increased dominance and presence of military figures in executive and legislative fields is also very new development in Egypt. In addition, the unprecedented economic privileges that was guaranteed to the military in the coup regime encouraged by El Sisi himself as president. The military also controlled the media and eliminated any potential opposition even those who supported the coup. The new position of the military assumed by this article will be more explained in detail in each of the pre-mentioned aspects in the following parts.

3.1. Constitutional Level

When Mubarak was ousted in January 2011 uprising, SCAF suspended the constitution, which was active since 1971. On 19 March 2012, a new constitution was planned to be drafted by an elected committee from the two chambers representatives. After the election of the two houses of representatives, the People Assembly (Majlis El Sha'b) and the Consulting Assembly (Majlis El Shura), which was dominated by Muslim Brothers Islamist coalition, new constitution drafting committee was formed. On 13 June 2012, the committee was deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Supreme Court and hence dissolved. Later, another committee was formed and then witnessed political conflict between Muslim Bothers coalition and opposition parties that ended with wide resignations from opposition parties protesting the dominance of Islamist parties. On 22 November 2012, Morsi issued constitutional decree that fortified the committee from dissolution and the draft was approved in referendum in 2012. When Morsi was ousted on 3 July 2013, the leaders of new regime

appointed *Committee of Ten*, which was then replaced by *Committee of Fifty* to draft constitution. The new draft, by which military power in politics has increased constitutionally, was approved by the referendum on January 2014.

The new constitution guarantees the Minister of Defence, who is usually served in the higher positions in the military, to stay in office for two successive terms as a tool of immunity from dismissal. This empowerment creates a situation, in which the President does not have full authority over the Minister of Defence. The new constitution also suggests that SCAF would be headed by the Minister of Defence, not by the President. The composition of National Defence Council, which is the sole institution to have a right for overseeing the budget of military, has also been in change in favor of the military over civilians. Even though the representative of military dominated National Defence Council during the Morsi period, it was not as high as in the post-coup constitution.

3.2. *Executive Level*

The changes at the executive level are significant to understand the military dominancy in Egyptian politics. The first cabinet that was established immediately after the coup composed by the wide participation of civilian politicians from different political orientation. After a while, it is observed that President El-Sisi preferred to work with technocrats rather than bureaucrats, who are from political groups or parties. By the establishment of new military regime, political allies as they may hold contradictory political views were marginalized and the ex-military officers were empowered in the executive apparatus. The majority of governors' positions were regained by the military, in contrary to the period of Morsi which marked decrease in the numbers of ex-militaries in the governors comparing to the period of Mubarak. On 7 February 2015, El Sisi appointed eleven ex-military and police officers to the governmental positions.¹⁴ On December 2015, eleven

¹⁴ Attiya Nabil, "Egypt: Decrease in Number of Military Personnel in New Governors Movement," BBC News Arabic. (Arapça), 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/arabic/>

new governors replaced dismissed ones. Four out of eleven were military officers and included some police generals.¹⁵ Again, on September 2016 six new governors were appointed five of them were ex-military officers.¹⁶ The last move in February 2017 produced governor's council with seventeen generals from military and police.

Looking at only the numbers of ex-military and police officers in the governors may not be enough to understand the dominant role of military in Egyptian politics. Sub-levels of the governorates in the regions and neighbourhoods are also composed by ex-military and ex-police officers. For example, the largest governorate and the capital Cairo; the Governor have three deputies two of them are ex-officers; one from military and one from police.¹⁷ Cairo is divided into four main regions; northern, southern, eastern and western. The western region, for instance, includes nine neighbourhoods; four out of nine is chaired by ex-military generals and one is headed by ex-police general.¹⁸ These examples demonstrate the influence of military personnel in the top-level positions in the governorates as a reward for their loyalty to the military regime.

Other organizations like the seaports exhibited the same pattern of military personnel concentration. The Egyptian seaports are classified into four major areas under four organizations; Alexandria

multimedia/2015/02/150207_egypt_gov [Erişim tarihi: 6 Ekim 2018].

¹⁵ "The generals control the new governors' movement and take the oath", (Arapça), 2015, *Al Araby*, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2015/12/26/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1> [Erişim tarihi: 6 Ekim 2018].

¹⁶ "Egypt: The military governors' movement", (Arapça), 2016, *Noonpost*, <http://www.noonpost.org/content/13846> [Erişim tarihi: 6 Ekim 2018].

¹⁷ "Cairo Governorate Official Gate. Regions and Neighbourhoods," (Arapça) 2018, [http://www.cairo.gov.eg/areas/default_copy\(4\).aspx](http://www.cairo.gov.eg/areas/default_copy(4).aspx) [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

¹⁸ *A.g.e.*

Ports authority, Port Said Ports Authority, Red Sea Ports Authority and Damietta Ports Authority. Military Generals chair the four ports organizations; three of them are navy generals.¹⁹ In Alexandria Ports Authority, the board of members consists of seventeen members; five of them are military officers including the chairperson.²⁰ This data shows the penetration of the military personnel into the high-level positions inside the Egyptian Seaports administration.

As a conclusion, the presence of military officers at the governmental managerial positions, specifically in the provincial administrations, shows the influence of military in politics. These political rewards and second career trend originates from Mubarak period and was nearly untouched during Morsi period. Morsi also appointed military generals to the administrative authorities following this tradition. Nevertheless, El Sisi regime extensively used this system to reward his loyal officers and gain the required patronage over military officer to counter any negative action inside the army and assure its alignment with the new regime.

3.3. Legislative Level

The legislative field also witnessed increased influence of the military. The first level of influence was delaying of the formation of legislative branch, which afforded El Sisi with the power of issuing decrees. El Sisi used this authority actively to issue large number of decrees (in total 342 decree were issued before the parliament was elected, most of them by El Sisi and small number by Interim President Adly Mansour), which would be approved later when the legislative

¹⁹ Egyptian Seaports Authorities internet sayfası, (Arapça) 2018, <http://www.emdb.gov.eg/ar/content/56-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

²⁰ Alexandria Port Authority internet sayfası, Representatives, 2018, <http://apa.gov.eg/index.php/en/board-of-director> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

branch is formed. The second level is designing the election law that will create more advantageous position for El Sisi favored political parties and groups. On the one hand, the parliament would work in favor of the regime with nearly no opposition, on the other hand the parliament would be a tool for full support of the regime and punishment of the oppositions. The approved legislations also favored El Sisi and the economic activities of the military and facilitated it. The quantitative measure of the military as a member of the Parliament showed the presence of influential percentage of the military and police ex-personnel in the parliament, where 71 retired Generals from military and police are active.²¹ This is also another characteristic of the affiliation to the military that augments its political power in the legislative field. The regime attempts to produce tamed parliament was successful, this step was important because the SCAF was clashing with MB over their control on the legislative branch. The post-coup regime favored friendly legislative branch that would ease its control over the politics.

Pro-regime list won all the 120 seats; it was a coalition of Free Egyptian party and old Mubarak regime figures named Love of Egypt. Free Egyptian Party was financed by the Egyptian wealthy man Naguib Swaris and won 65 seats from list and independents.²² This coalition was widely claimed to be formed by security apparatus.²³ Second winner by 53 seats was Nation's Future Party strongly tied to El Sisi. The Salafist party Al Nour, which supported the coup although

²¹ Mahmoud Hussein, "Learn the Professions of the Parliament Members". Youm7 (Arapça) 2015, <https://www.youm7.com/story/2015/12/27/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%8059-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8%D8%A7/2510807> [Erişim tarihi 11 Kasım 2018].

²² Jan Claudius Völkel (2017). "Sidelined By Design: Egypt's Parliament in Transition". *The Journal of North African Studies*, 22(4) s. 609.

²³ A.g.e., s. 609.

it was part of Muslim Brotherhood coalition in the previous elections was supported by the Gulf monarchies. It only won 11 seats after major media campaign against it.²⁴ 116 of the MP were businessmen representing nearly one fifth²⁵, besides 71 retired Generals from military and police.²⁶ Abd El Al was elected as the Head of The Parliament on the day of inauguration and declared that the task of the parliament is supporting the government.²⁷ In contrast to the monitoring task of the legislative body, he demanded the representatives not to be critical to the government. Moreover, he issued gag order prohibiting discussion on the economic crisis.²⁸

From the functional perspective, the parliament passed several legislations in the favor of the regime and the military dominance. The parliament approved increases in the pension of retired military officers twice; 10% in July 2016 and 15% on the following year on July 2017, and by 15% on June 2018.²⁹ In addition, the parliament

²⁴ A.g.e. s. 609.

²⁵ A.g.e. s. 608.

²⁶ Mahmoud Hussein, "Learn the Professions of the Parliament Members". Youm7 (Arapça) 2015, <https://www.youm7.com/story/2015/12/27/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%8059-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8%D8%A7/2510807> [Erişim tarihi 11 Kasım 2018].

²⁷ Jan Claudius Völkel, "Sideline By Design: Egypt's Parliament in Transition". *The Journal of North African Studies*, 22(4), 2017, s. 610.

²⁸ A.g.e., s. 610.

²⁹ "El Sisi period: Ninth Increase in military Personnel Wages After Diplomats and Ministers". Arapça, *Alaraby*, (2018). [online] Available at: <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2018/4/19/%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%D9>

approved terrorism law that allow the military trials for civilians, apply harsh penalties for the terrorism-related crimes and shield military officers.³⁰ On July 2018, the parliament passed a law giving El Sisi the authority to immune military officers from prosecution in events related to the period between the coup in July 2013 and the inauguration of parliament on January 2016.³¹ When MP Mohammed Anwar Sadat, who was the chairman of Human Rights Committee until 2016, criticized the increase in pensions Abd El Al told him ‘you are not allowed to talk about the soldiers who paid the blood tax.’³²

3.4. Judiciary

Judiciary played crucial role in supporting the new regime. Interim President after the coup was the head of Supreme Constitutional Court. It seems that Judiciary has been a tool of political repression by giving hard sentences to the opposition political groups, who opposed the coup regime, those sentences issued by the judiciary were mostly suspected to be of political nature. In addition, Judiciary provided the cover for the military and security forces to freely crack down on the dissents by giving light sentences even in the extreme cases that witnessed involvement of security personnel in the killing out of the law. The post-coup period witnessed the reactivation of exceptional courts related to the emergency state with special authorities and forms.

The military itself participated in the judicial campaign through military trials for civilians. El Sisi issued law no. 136 in 2014 that demanded the military forces to help police forces in protecting vital

%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86 [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

³⁰ Jan Claudius Völkel, “Sideline By Design: Egypt’s Parliament in Transition”. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 22(4), 2017, s. 611.

³¹ “Egypt passes law that could shield top military brass from prosecution” *Reuters*, (Arapça), 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-parliament-military/egypt-passes-law-that-could-shield-top-military-brass-from-prosecution-idUSKBN1K61L7> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

³² Jan Claudius Völkel, “Sideline By Design: Egypt’s Parliament in Transition”. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 22(4), 2017, s. 611.

organizations, potential protest spots, such as universities, industrial factories, roads, bridges and railways.³³ By including these spots under the military protection, the law authorized the military courts to oversight any cases related to the violations of this law. This law resulted in more than 7,000 civilians to be on trial in military courts between 2014 and 2015; 3,000 out of those 7,000 were on trial in the first five months after the law.³⁴ On June 2016, President expanded the military courts authority to include 2 km diameter around public properties, which causes civilians to be exposed for military trials and contradicts with the normal authorities naturally practiced by civil courts. In addition, on August 2016, the parliament extended the active period of law no. 136 until 2021.³⁵ Furthermore, on April 2017, President El Sisi declared the emergency status in the country; this brought Emergency courts, which were linked to Mubarak regime exploitation against oppositions, into action again on January 2018.³⁶ Moreover, President could add military officers to these courts.³⁷ In

³³ Sahar Aziz, "The Expanding Jurisdiction of Egypt's Military Courts," 2016, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/64840> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

³⁴ *A.g.e.*

³⁵ Sahar Aziz, "The Expanding Jurisdiction of Egypt's Military Courts," 2016, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/64840> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

³⁶ Yasin Boutiti, "Egypt Creating 'State Security Emergency' Courts and Define Its Related Cases," (Arapça) 2018, https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/920861-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B0-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/ [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

³⁷ Rana Mamdouh, "Keeping Courts in a State of Emergency," 2018, <https://madamasr.com/en/2018/07/10/feature/politics/keeping-courts-in-a-state-of-emergency/> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

fact, the military itself has now extensively been present through expanding the authorities of military courts resulting in wide military trials for civilians.

3.5. *Media and Civil Society*

The Egyptian media, which prohibits any opposition views against the new regime, has also been controlled by the military after the coup. The military started to acquire the media enterprises under its direct administration or under the General Intelligence. The control of media by the military was used against the civil society by undermining NGOs, which have been described as destabilizing actors and linked with foreign states by media. This propaganda was accompanied by new legal frame that directed to strengthen the state monitoring over the NGOs. The post-coup period witnessed domination of the military over media and marginalization of the civil society. People, who were key elements in the extensive opposition campaign against Morsi; were eliminated from TV programs or from writing in journals during El Sisi presidency. For instance, Yousri Fouda, Mahmoud Saad and Amr El Lithy are some of the banned names in media. Bassem Youssef, who was presenting highly popular sarcasm show, was also prohibited after two episodes only. Belal Fadl and Alaa Al Aswani were prohibited from writing.³⁸ All these names adopt secular and anti-Islamist orientation. In 2017, the government banned 114 of websites based in Qatar and Turkey, which are seen as pro-

³⁸ Mustafa Mehana, "Blocking Media in Egypt" (Arapça), *Qantara*, 2017, <https://ar.qantara.de/content/%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%9F> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

Morsi supporters.³⁹ Moreover, it banned other websites belong to registered Egyptian media organizations, like Egypt Daily News.⁴⁰

3.6. Economic Activities

Economic activities of the Egyptian military, which is organized through several economic organizations and enterprises, are also considered as an important parameter to understand the extent of military power. Those organizations were primarily for military purposes; however, by the peace accords with Israel in 1979 they started to have non-military economic role as well. The military also enjoyed special advantages while practicing its businesses, such as exemptions of tariffs and taxes. In fact, the private sector and foreign investors are reluctant to compete with the privileged military in business, which badly affects Egyptian economy.

The details of military budget, which was estimated around 4.5 billion USD in 2016, is considered national secret and exclusively overlooked by the SCAF.⁴¹ Although President El Sisi stated that the military share in economics is not exceeding 2%⁴², there are some estimations argue that its ratio is between 20 and 60%.⁴³ El Sisi encouraged the assignment of economic projects to military firms, justifying that the private sector would take much more time to accomplish the requested projects.⁴⁴ The Egyptian army is also

³⁹ *A.g.e.*

⁴⁰ *A.g.e.*

⁴¹ "The Officers' Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power." Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 8.

⁴² "Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi's Egypt," *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy-specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁴³ Abigail Hauslohner. "Egypt's 'Military Inc' Expands Its Control of The Economy". *The Guardian*, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/egypt-military-economy-power-elections> [Erişim tarihi 4 Nisan 2018].

⁴⁴ "Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi's Egypt," *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy->

economically powerful, since it has right to open bank account and practice economic activities through number of entities, including the Ministry of Defence with dozens of commercial ventures, the Military Production Ministry with its 20 companies, National Service Products Organization (NSPO) with its 21 companies, National Authority for Military Production, Arab Organization for Industrialization with its at least 12 companies and Armed Forces Engineering Authority.⁴⁵

Economic activities of the Army penetrated nearly every single field of the Egyptian economy. For instance, the National Service Products Organization (NSPO) firms covers the following fields: 10 companies in Agriculture and Food Industry, 5 in the Industrial Field and 2 in the Engineering Field.⁴⁶ In 2016, NSPO was awarded thousands of feddans of state lands dedicated for fish farms.⁴⁷ New cement plant has being built in Beni Suef city south Cairo under NSPO, the plant worth 1.1 billion USD.⁴⁸ Armed Forces Engineering Authority mainly controls the mega infrastructure project in partnership with major MNCs as General Electric and Mitsubishi.⁴⁹ The AFEA was awarded a contract worth 4.7 billion EGP that nearly equal 266 million USD for national roads projects including 22 road, 30 bridge and 11 tunnels.⁵⁰ The military also owns 51% of a company responsible of the New Administrative Capital project. Five out of 13 members of board are from

specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185 [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁴⁵ A.g.e.

⁴⁶ “The Officers’ Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power.” Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 9.

⁴⁷ A.g.e., s. 12 .

⁴⁸ “Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi’s Egypt,” *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy-specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁴⁹ “The Officers’ Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power.” Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 9.

⁵⁰ A.g.e, s. 12.

the armed forces.⁵¹ In 2013, El Sisi encouraged the military to establish international schools offering American and British curriculum, which was finalized in March 2015 with Badr International Schools.⁵²

In May 2019, Military Production Ministry, which was established in 1954 to produce grenade launchers, pistols and machine guns, signed memorandum to build 2 billion USD solar plant in partnership with Chinese firm.⁵³ It established 44 projects of installing solar panels on educational buildings and established solar energy stations in Cairo in 2017 and declared it has another contract for another station worth 4.37 million EGP (248 thousand USD).⁵⁴ The Military Production Ministry also owns Maadi Co. for engineering industries; the company produces green houses, medical devices and gyms.⁵⁵ Heliopolis Co. for Chemical Industries is also under the Ministry of Military Production controls 20% of the paints market in Egypt and planning to control major share of the market.⁵⁶ These are some economic activities of the Military Production Ministry and for the fiscal year 2018/2019, it is expected that its revenue is around 15

⁵¹ “The Most Important 32 Information on The New Administrative Capital,” (Arapça), 2018, <https://www.propertyfinder.eg/blog/%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9/> [Erişim tarihi 11 Kasım 2018].

⁵² “The Officers’ Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power.” Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 12.

⁵³ “Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi’s Egypt,” *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy-specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁵⁴ “The Officers’ Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power.” Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 12.

⁵⁵ “Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi’s Egypt,” *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy-specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁵⁶ *A.g.e.*

billion EGP.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the Egyptian army is exempted from Value Added Tax (VAT) on goods that fall under the military needs and national security. However, it was reported that hotels and event halls are also free from VAT.⁵⁸

Last but not least, the army has unlimited control over desert areas constituting 94% of the Egyptian territories.⁵⁹ In December 2015, a decree was issued stating that revenues from selling processes will be directed to establish new military zones. This declaration would most likely to be viewed as legalization for the selling of lands as way for investment⁶⁰ and lands could be used as patronage tool over civilians.

There are also some doubts about the army's economic activities in the Egyptian market. After severe shortage in baby milk's formula in September 2016, the military announced it had exported large quantities selling it at half price of the market.⁶¹ After drug shortage in 2017, the army declared it would establish pharmaceutical production company.⁶² In addition, when the government-imposed taxes on air conditions parts, the army announced importing parts from China that of course will be exempted from taxes and tariffs.⁶³ Such incidents inevitably resulted in discouraging foreign investors to invest in Egypt. A commercial officer in western embassy in Cairo, for instance, emphasized reluctance of foreign investors stating that "investors were

⁵⁷ A.g.e.

⁵⁸ A.g.e.

⁵⁹ "The Officers' Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power." Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 10.

⁶⁰ A.g.e, s. 10.

⁶¹ Heba Saleh, "When the Egyptian army means business," *Financial Times*, 15 December 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/49b5d19a-bff6-11e6-9bca-2b93a6856354> [Erişim tarihi 11 Kasım 2018].

⁶² "The Officers' Republic, The Egyptian Military and Abuse of Power." Transparency International UK ,(2018). s. 12.

⁶³ Jamal Boukhari, "Egypt's Conscripts Serving The Army's Economic Empire," 2017, *Al Araby*, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/9/5/egypts-conscripts-serving-the-armys-economic-empire> [Erişim tarihi 11 Kasım 2018].

reluctant to invest in sectors where the military is expanding or in one they might enter.”⁶⁴

4. Impacts of Authoritarian Decision on the Functionality of Military

Most of the literatures on civil-military relations focus on the negative impacts of the military intervention in politics on the democratization process. On the one hand, the expansion of power and authority of the military negatively affects the democratization process; on the other hand, however, it becomes more vulnerable to the leader, who is seeking for consolidating his own authority. There are studies that explain how the unbalanced civil-military relations, making military-related decisions to consolidate authoritarian regime, could negatively affect the efficiency of the military. Brooks, for instance, argues that the military regime, which tends to develop centralized decision-making authority, would decrease the efficiency of military itself.⁶⁵ If the appointments to the military positions are made solely by the motivations for consolidating authoritarian leader’s legitimacy, this would result in decreasing the military effectiveness in its professional duties. Moreover, the military regime would decrease homogeneity within military and accumulations of expertise the adversely affect the military performance, which in return reduces the possibility of cooperation and coordination within military.⁶⁶

As aforementioned, the SCAF acquired independence from the civilians in the military affairs. This independency includes the institutional ones. SCAF represents the leadership of the Egyptian

⁶⁴ “Special Report: From War Room to Boardroom. Military Firms Flourish in Sisi’s Egypt” *Reuters*, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-military-economy-specialreport/special-report-from-war-room-to-boardroom-military-firms-flourish-in-sisi-egypt-idUSKCN1IH185> [Erişim tarihi 6 Ekim 2018].

⁶⁵ Risa Brooks “Civil-Military Relations In The Middle East”. *The Future Security Environment in the Middle East*, (2004) *RAND Corporation*. s. 141

⁶⁶ *A.g.e.*, s. 141-148

military and has been politically active since January 2011. While El Sisi was looking for presidency, he wanted to guarantee that there would not be any move from the military against him. SCAF undergone crucial changes after the military coup and especially during the first term of El Sisi presidency, these changes resulted in almost new SCAF members.⁶⁷ In general, it was politically driven, which means that professional quality, skills and experiences were not the selection criteria.

After the approval of candidacy of El Sisi for presidency by SCAF,⁶⁸ its membership increased from 20 to 23 members.⁶⁹ Following the decrees, appointments to the military positions started to be made by El Sisi relatively and frequently earlier than the traditional pattern, which resulted in shorter period at the office.⁷⁰ The frequent changes in the military positions result in two important consequences; the one is preferring loyalty than professionalism, which is caused unsurprisingly by the lack of legitimacy of politicians and inevitably affects the quality and efficiency of the Egyptian Army. The second is creating the continuation of military's penetration to the politics and economics, as a result of their appointments to the relatively less influential, but profitable governmental positions.

Since El Sisi needs the support from military, he attempted to

⁶⁷ Egypt State Information Services page (2014). Adly Mansour issues decree reforming SCAF. [online] Available at: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/84685?lang=ar> [Accessed 11 Dec. 2018].

⁶⁸ "The Army Accepts El Sisi Candidacy For Presidency," 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2014/1/27/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1> [Erişim tarihi: 11 Aralık 2018]

⁶⁹ Egypt State Information Services page (2014). Adly Mansour issues decree reforming SCAF. [online] Available at: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/84685?lang=ar> [Erişim tarihi 11 Aralık 2018].

⁷⁰ Gilad Wenig, Egypt's New Military Brass. (2014) [Washingtoninstitute.org](http://www.washingtoninstitute.org). <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-new-military-brass> [Erişim tarihi 11 Aralık 2018].

create a council, which would not pose any serious threat against him. Therefore, he appointed trusted names to the influential positions. For instance, Sedki Sobhy was appointed as Chief of Staffs and Mahmoud Hegazy became the Head of Military Intelligence. In addition, Ahmed Wasfy the chief of the 3rd field army was assigned to less influential role as the Head of Training Authority.⁷¹ The second important change happened a year later in April 2015, when Mohamed El Shahat replaced Salah El Badry as Head of Military Intelligence, Ossama Mounir replaced Ossama El Gendy as Navy Forces Commander, Nasser El Asy replaced Mohamed El Shahat as Commander of the 2nd Field Army.⁷² These changes were made when the army was facing increased insurgency, especially in Sinai.

On December 2016, El Sisi once again issued presidential decree, resulting in a new shuffle in the armed forces, including the dismissal of Abd Elmonem El Tarras, the Commander of the Air Defence Forces. El Tarras was thought to be potential candidate to become Chief of Staff, as representing the last SCAF member from 1973 October war fighters.⁷³ El Sisi ignored El Terras and appointed his brother-in-law Hegazy, who was the Head of Military Intelligence. His dismissal also demonstrated the attempt of El Sisi for ending any potential political threat to himself, since El Tarras had ties with Sami Anan, ex-Chief of Staff. Since Sami Anan declared his candidacy for Presidential election, but withdrew immediately in 2014, he started to

⁷¹ *A.g.e.*

⁷² Deena Helmy. "In The Era of Sisi Life Cycle of Army Leaders is not Complete" (Arapça), 2017, *ida2at* <https://www.ida2at.com/in-the-era-of-sisi-life-cycle-of-army-leaders-is-not-complete/> [Erişim 11 Aralık 2018].

⁷³ "El Sisi Dominates SCAF October Generation excluded," (Arapça), 2016, *Al Araby*, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2016/12/18/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%87> [Erişim tarihi: 11 Aralık 2018].

be perceived as a potential political competitor. Therefore, it is mentioned that as a result of tension and competition between El Sisi and Anan, the new regime payed attention to keep military personnel, who either worked with or have ties with Anan, away from the high military positions.⁷⁴ Also, appointment of El Tarras by El Sisi as his consultant demonstrates the policies of the regime to ensure its control on the ex-high position military personnel.

By the same presidential decree, Ahmed Khaled Hassan replaced Ossama Mounir and became the Navy Forces Commander.⁷⁵ Ossama Mounir was appointed in April 2015 and dismissed in December 2016.⁷⁶ His predecessor, Ossama El Gendy, was influential figure within the SCAF, so decrease the influence of El Gendy could be meaningful for the El Sisi regime. However, this necessitated to make two-round changes to escape from El Gendy's influence.

These changes within the Egyptian military reduces its efficiency and sufficiency, specifically in countering terrorism, which could easily be tracked from the report of Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. According to that report, in the first year after the coup, for instance, an average of 19 attacks were reported monthly. The major insurgent group, Ansar Beytul Maqdes (ABW) in Sinai Peninsula announced its allegiance to ISIS and changed its name to Welayet Sina on November 2014. Till April 2018 Welayet Sina

⁷⁴A.g.e.

⁷⁵ Deena Helmy. "In The Era of Sisi Life Cycle of Army Leaders is not Complete" (Arapça), 2017, *ida2at* <https://www.ida2at.com/in-the-era-of-sisi-life-cycle-of-army-leaders-is-not-complete/> [Erişim 11 Aralık 2018]; 2017, <https://www.ida2at.com/in-the-era-of-sisi-life-cycle-of-army-leaders-is-not-complete/> [Erişim 11 Aralık 2018].

⁷⁶ "El Sisi Dominates SCAF October Generation excluded excluded," (Arapça), 2016, *Al Araby*, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2016/12/18/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%87> [Erişim tarihi: 11 Aralık 2018].

claimed 995 attack resulting in 558 casualties among security forces and 329 among civilians. The major attack of Welayet Sina was downing of the Russian plane over Sinai, killing 224 passengers and leading to harm the Egyptian tourism sector and raising doubts about the level of security in the Egyptians airports. Welayet Sina targeted Christians and Sufis; the major attack happened on a Sufi mosque killing 311 prayer. From August 2017 until April 2018 an average of 14 attack monthly were reported. After the military coup the state reported nearly 1800-security operations, 39% of them were in Sinai. Until April 2018, 27,000 were reported to be arrested in counter-insurgency operations. Those operations resulted in nearly 7,000 casualties 95% of them in Sinai.⁷⁷

Various groups emerged after the coup and used violence as a mean of political opposition against the coup. While the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) officially announced that they adapt peaceful policy for opposing the coup, some groups were viewed as being formed by MB youth who adopted different thoughts, such as Allied Popular Resistance Movement, Hassm and Liwaa al-Thawra. From August 2015 until January 2018 an average of 3 attacks per month were reported with at least one causality.⁷⁸

Lastly, what happened in Oasis attack also represents a clear example for the lack of coordination within military. On 20th of October 2017, a group of security forces that were working under the Ministry of Interior moved to arrest the members of Hassm, who are former MB members and support violent acts, in the training camp in the western desert. As the forces were on its way it was attacked from all sides resulting in more than fifty casualties. Then, it was discovered that it was a trap of an Al Qaeda-affiliated group.⁷⁹ About this case, it

⁷⁷ “Five Years of Egypt’s War on Terror” *The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy*, <https://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/TIMEP-ESW-5yrReport-7.27.18.pdf> [Erişim tarihi 11 Alarık 2018].

⁷⁸ *A.g.e.*

⁷⁹ “Did Al Wahat Accident Overthrow Hegazy?” (Arapça), 2017, *Al Araby*,

is known that the army was not informed and there was a delay in sending surveillance planes to the accident place that helped terrorists to withdraw their injured members and take over some weapons and assets from the police forces.⁸⁰ The lack of coordination due to competition between various organizations can be also noticed in the previous accident. The police forces moved without reporting to the military forces. It was also thought that Chief of Staff Hegazy did not order the planes to move as he was waiting the police forces to ask for help.⁸¹ In fact, such incidents are increasing doubts about the efficiency of the military professional performances, specifically in counter-terrorism, and the impacts of military regime on the military itself.

Another important trend that can be noticed is the conciliation after the dismissal, appointing the dismissed officers in symbolic nominal places or ones that include material privileges. When El Gendy was removed from Navy Forces, he was appointed in the Suez Canal Authority as Deputy Chair, the same applies to his successor, Ossama Mounir, who followed the same path. Removal of Salah El Badry, who was the Head of Military Intelligence in 2015 and Taher Abdallah, who was the Head of Engineering Authority, were appointed as Assistant Defence Minister.⁸² Ahmed Ali, who was the spokesperson of the Armed Forces, was also appointed as Information Secretary in the Presidency, then as military attaché in one of the Egyptian embassies.⁸³ Mohamed El Assar, who was also one of prominent figures of SCAF

<https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2017/11/1/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A-1> [Erişim tarihi 16 Aralık 2018].

⁸⁰ A.g.e.

⁸¹ A.g.e.

⁸² Deena Helmy. "In The Era of Sisi Life Cycle of Army Leaders is not Complete" (Arapça), 2017, *ida2at* <https://www.ida2at.com/in-the-era-of-sisi-life-cycle-of-army-leaders-is-not-complete/> [Erişim 11 Aralık 2018].

⁸³ A.g.e.

after January 2011 and was known for his role in the military cooperation with US and preventing any sanctions following the coup, was appointed as the Military Production Minister, which represents one of the important tools that controls the army economic activities.⁸⁴ While the position provides economic privileges, it deprives him from the membership of the SCAF, which possess both political and institutional power. In fact, appointment of the ex-high position military personnel to the politically less, but economically more privileged position in the government, perfectly guarantees their political loyalty and deepens their involvement into politics and economics.

In fact, the post-coup period is characterized by shorter stay of officers in high-level positions in comparison with the previous periods. When El Sisi started his second term, he appointed Mohommad Zaki, as Minister of Defence, dismissing Sobhy. Chief of Staff, Hegazy was also dismissed in 2017, 3 years after the appointment. Between 2014 and 2017, there were two different Commanders of Air Defence and three different commanders of the Navy Forces. According to Helmy, serving in the same position for shorter term would be caused by some different reasons; one of them could be the desire to prevent any commander from forming popular base in any of the important positions, which may cause to any threat against or potential competition with El Sisi. The second reason could be the desire of elimination of dissent members from the Army. Third reason could be the political will for the formation of stable SCAF composition, which could bear increased power vis-a-vis the presidency.⁸⁵ In addition, the current regime would aim to gain the support of the Army through these appointments.

⁸⁴ Mohamed El Bahrawi. "Mohamed El Assar "the diplomat" the engineer of Egypt-US relations. 2015 online] *Almasryalyoum.com*. Available at: <https://www.almasyalyoum.com/news/details/813625> [Accessed 11 Dec. 2018].

⁸⁵ Deena Helmy. "In The Era of Sisi Life Cycle of Army Leaders is not Complete" (Arapça), 2017, *ida2at* <https://www.ida2at.com/in-the-era-of-sisi-life-cycle-of-army-leaders-is-not-complete/> [Erişim 11 Aralık 2018].

Conclusion

The power of military in Egyptian politics has always been the case. However, it seems that the popular movements, which toppled down the Mubarak regime, were not successfully created a ground for a democratization process through ending the authoritarian rules and the dominance of military in politics. The expansion of power and authority of military in Egyptian politics could be seen at different levels and through different tools; such as constitutional, executive and judicial power of military and its influence over media and civil society and finally its economic power. The continuity of unbalanced civil-military relations in Egypt and its deterioration in the post-coup of 2013 does harm not only the political life but also the military itself, resulting in deficiency of its functional duties.

Özet

Asker, Nasır döneminden beri Mısır siyasetinde güçlü ve etkin bir aktör olmuştur. 2010 yılında halk ayaklanmasıyla sona eren Mübarek rejiminden sonra Mısır'da demokratikleşme ihtimaline dair umutlar yeşerse de Sisi yönetimine karşı yapılan askeri darbeye asker-sivil ilişkisindeki denge bir kez daha askerler lehine kaymış ve Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin başat aktör olmalarını hızlandıran bir süreç yaşanmıştır. Bu makale Temmuz 2013 yılından sonraki süreçte Mısır siyasetindeki asker-sivil ilişkisini analiz etmekte ve askerlerin hem Mısır siyasetinde hem de ekonomisinde elde ettikleri ayrıcalıklı haklarla ne kadar güçlendiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, anayasanın askerlere tanıdığı haklar, yasama-yürütme-yargı katmanlarında askerlerin edindikleri ayrıcalıklar, askerlerin ekonomik güçleri ve faaliyetleri, medya ve sivil toplum üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. Makale, 2013 yılından itibaren Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin ayrıcalıklı konumlarının güçlendiğini savunmakla birlikte, bu sürecin Mısır ordusunun kurumsal ve askeri verimliliğini de azalttığını öne sürmektedir.

2013 yılından beri, Anayasal olarak askerler güçlenmişlerdir. Yürütme erkinde eski askerler, sadece devlet görevlerinde değil, aynı

zamanda etkin olan Limanlar, İdari Gözetim Makamı gibi diğer kurumlarda da önemli görevlere atanmaktadırlar. Yasama erkinde Parlamentoda bulunan askeri kökenli milletvekillerinin sayısı da artmaktadır. Yargı erkinde de askeri yargının güçlendirilerek siyasi muhalefeti kontrol altında tutma amacının varlığından söz edilebilir. Askerlerin siyaset ve ekonomideki etkinliklerini gösteren bir diğer gösterge de yürüttükleri ekonomik faaliyetlerdir. Medyanın kontrolünün de askerler elinde olduğu dikkate alındığında sivil toplumun gelişiminin nasıl baskılandığı ve 2003 yılından itibaren Mısır'da askeri rejimin sağlama süreci anlaşılabilir.

Asker-sivil ilişkilerinin incelendiği kuramsal ve/veya teorik çalışmaların birçoğu, gücün askerlerin elinde yoğunlaşması durumunu, demokratikleşme sorunsalı çerçevesinde analiz etmişler, askeri yeterlilik ve etkinlik açısından değerlendirmemişlerdir. Bu makalede savunulduğu gibi Mısır siyasetinde ve ekonomisinde askerler lehine değişen sivil-asker dengesi, sadece Mısır siyasetini etkilememekte, aynı zamanda Mısır ordusunun da özellikle askeri anlamda etkinliğini zayıflatmaktadır. 2013 yılından itibaren artan askeri atamalarda askeri yetkinlik ve yeterlilik yerine siyasal sadakatın öncellenmiş olduğu görülmekte, bu durumun askeri-otoriter bir rejimi sağladığı gibi, güvenlikle ilgili karşılaşılan son gelişmeler dikkate alındığında Ordu'nun yetkinliğine ve etkinliğine zarar veriyor olduğu vurgulanmıştır.

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